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The status of government’s legal adviser in Israel is complicated and controversial. This status deeply impacts discretion and independence, especially in the role of combating corruption. This article aims to review the status, power and independence of the government’s legal adviser and his/her interaction with other legal institutions dealing with corruption cases.

The author argues that the period of the 1980s, in Israel, was characterized by prosecution’s activism because of the dramatically increased number of corruption-related cases.

Prominent government legal advisers formulated approaches to the struggle against political corruption in Israel; upon becoming justices of the supreme court, they successfully transited their prosecution mindset to judicial activism (and not only for corruption-related cases).

This article discovers a linkage between prosecution and judicial positions, not under the Israeli legislation but based on personal willingness to combat corruption.

It matters who leads. Answering the research question will help to achieve early recognition of revanchist leadership and its harmful effects and help to determine why it emerges and how it works and spreads. This article is to encourage further study of its widening presence and of the remedies.

Through two contemporary case studies, this article seeks a better understanding of “revanchist leadership” and identify its distinct and permanent properties (DNA) and the way it works (modus operandi). Thus, it will simultaneously demonstrate that revanchist leadership is not a uniquely historic but a recurring and contemporary phenomenon. Based on an analysis of both public leadership theory and leadership practice, the authors conceive of leadership as a multi-faceted concept, made of the following four components. First is leadership as a person, i.e. the personal characteristics, traits, style and skills of the individual leader. Second is leadership as the position, i.e. the work of leading people, with a focus on the formal role and responsibilities. Third is leadership as a process, i.e. the work of enabling leadership, with a focus on coordinating, facilitating and directing internal and external parties. And fourth is leadership as embodiment of a common purpose, i.e. the work of leadership serving the greater good, both as an individual and the collective. In addition to this so called “4-P model” (Hopman and van den Berg, 2015; Grint, 2010) of public leadership, it is important that in order to understand leadership, the psychological, political, institutional, historical and geographical contexts determine to a large extent the impact of leadership, but the authors assume that – ultimately – there remains an element of personal choice of options and opportunities available [1]. To answer the research question, the authors follow a case-based approach. The descriptions and analyses of the cases are not only based on literature but also informed by personal experience in diplomatic work in the area's mentioned. It is important to focus not only on the persons of the leaders but also on their followers, as well as the political, institutional and international context. As part of this analysis, (ab)use of institutions and the leading political-historical narratives that underpin revanchist policies are taken into account [2].

The case-based analysis shows a similarity of the two cases, although the two cases developed largely independently, with a time difference of about 20 years and under quite different historic and geographic conditions. This support the research hypothesis that revanchist leadership might be considered a distinct style of political leadership, with specific defining elements, a so called “DNA” and modus operandi of its own that emerges and grows gradually, when enabling historical and mass psychological contexts are present. The presence of such an enabling context might also serve as a warning indicator of risks (the analogy of a recurring political virus is tempting). The work of Kellerman on “bad leadership”, Lipman Blumen on “toxic leadership,” provides a useful conceptual framework to better understand, analyze and recognize revanchist leadership in two empirical cases. In part IV, the authors describe defining elements (a so-called “DNA”) of revanchist leadership and the risk of revanchist leadership to spread like a “political virus”. The authors conclude with the recommendation that revanchist leadership and its defining feature (“DNA”) be further researched, in order to be better able to recognize revanchist leadership at an early stage and to facilitate a structured assessment of the extent, this type of leadership is present today and by implication represent a threat to peace and security of other nations. This is relevant as the current times are characterized by uncertainty, heightened anxiety and increased tensions among nations as well as at times frightened populations, which form a fertile ground for the growth of revanchist leadership, as history teaches us.

The authors conclude with the recommendation that revanchist leadership and its defining feature (“DNA”) be further researched, in order to be better able to recognize revanchist leadership at an early stage and to facilitate a structured assessment of the extent, this type of leadership is present today and by implication represent a threat to peace and security of other nations. As a counterpoint the concept of “Partnership in Leadership” is introduced, as a remedial approach that deserves further attention.

It first demonstrates that this specific type of leadership, although unethical and harmful, can be effective in the short term from the point of view of the revanchist leader's intent, despite high human costs. Second – paradoxical as it may sound – the primary drive of the revanchist leader is not external (the object of the revanche) but internal (the determination to obtain and maintain internal power at all costs). Both factors make this style an attractive option for other public leaders, in a context of increased uncertainty.

Better understanding should help to remedy the threat posed by revanchist leadership to international peace and security. The authors will briefly discuss the – important but incomplete – countermeasures of the international community in the two cases. As a counterpoint the concept of “Partnership in Leadership” is introduced, as a remedial approach that deserves further attention.

It first demonstrates that this specific type of leadership, although unethical and harmful, can be effective in the short term from the point of view of the revanchist leader's intent, despite high human costs. Second – paradoxical as it may sound – the primary drive of the revanchist leader is not external (the object of the revanche) but internal (the determination to obtain and maintain internal power at all costs). Both factors make this style an attractive option for other public leaders, in a context of increased uncertainty. The instrumentalization of uncertainty described in the two cases in this stud, may serve as a warning of the existence of dangers of revanchist leadership today. The uncertainty born out of accelerating globalization, job and income insecurity and destabilizing demographic trends, the challenges of a multicultural society, has incentivized some public leaders in Europe and elsewhere to fan the flames of anxiety to justify autocratic and revanchist leadership styles, ignore agreed international rules and norms and prioritize geopolitical competition over cooperation. They set the sights of the nation on a glorious and powerful past as compass for the future. Several add to that revanchist claims of spheres of influence in neighboring countries. Better understanding should help to remedy the threat posed by revanchist leadership to international peace and security. The authors will briefly discuss the – important but incomplete – countermeasures of the international community in the two cases. As a counterpoint the concept of “Partnership in Leadership” is introduced, as a remedial approach that deserves further attention.

India became a NWS (Nuclear Weapons State) most reluctantly in May 1998 despite her demonstration of nuclear weapons capability 24 years earlier in May 1974. Having assumed the new status as the sixth overt nuclear weapons state, India also declared her principled policy governing use of nuclear weapons in the event of a national security threat. The Indian Nuclear Doctrine was called “minimum deterrence” by the BJP-led NDA government, but the Congress-led UPA government in 2004 renamed it as “credible deterrence.”

But the heart of the vibrant Indian nuclear doctrine is its commitment to No First Use (NFU) of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons were invented by the United States (U.S.). First-ever use of atom bomb is also made by the Americans and a philosophic foundation for the discussion on NFU was also laid in the U.S. However, having put the NFU in the philosophic parlance, the U.S. in the Cold War International environment professed the doctrine for First Use (FU) of nuclear weapons. It is China that made a first public commitment to the NFU after it became the fifth nuclear weapons state.

This chapter proposes to discuss Indian commitment to NFU as a first step on the long path toward global nuclear disarmament—or No Use (NU) of nuclear weapons. India saw Partial Test Ban treaty of 1963 as a step toward NU and also saw the discussions on NPT as another step toward nuclear disarmament as much as it wanted the big powers to see the CTBT too as a device aimed at putting world into NU bind. West, led by the U.S., was however only interested in using the CTBT to deny nuclear weapons status to threshold states, particularly India.

As a self-declared nuclear weapons state, India has, in nuclear doctrine, committed itself to nuclear disarmament. Can there be an international treaty between the declared nuclear weapons states? Can India and Russia come together on the issue? Can they convince China to join? With three Asian nuclear weapons states committing themselves to NFU, U.S. can see economic sense in an international treaty on NFU. Is it possible to create a global public opinion in favor of NU of nuclear weapons? The questions will be answered based on research conduct on the subject.

This chapter examines the changing nature of colonialism through time and the rise of postcolonialism as a Western metaphorical conjuncture declaring the end of colonialism. This chapter also reviews and examines the effects of imperialism’s rise and rivalry on colonialism and coloniality.

The purpose of this paper is to examine processes of Eurasian integration and the veritable ‘culture war’ between Russia and the West over it, while contributing to the theoretical paradigm of geopolitical economy. This paradigm invites us to consider the multiple manifestations of an emerging multipolar world order while scrutinising the extent to which previously popular approaches to the study of international political economy were themselves enmeshed in projects, the architects of which aspired to global hegemony.

The paper employs critical historicism, an approach in which cultural difference is seen as the sedimentation of historically constituted material and ideational processes and which eschews cultural essentialism and orientalising tropes. It is through this lens that Russian state attempts at normalising Eurasian integration processes are examined.

I demonstrate that Russian state organs and officials, as well as ‘political technologists’ attempt to de-politicise processes of Eurasian integration by appealing to both the logic of cultural/civilisational compatibility of affected parties, as well as the logic of economic integration. Such portrayals invite scrutiny; however, it is important that we also consider how Eurasian integration initiatives are the product of a post-Soviet struggle over Eurasian space but represent something more than mere neo-Soviet revisionism.

The paper demonstrates its originality by situating ongoing processes of Eurasian integration within the longer post-Soviet conjuncture and amid processes of international contestation. Moreover, it situates Russian officials and political technologists as active contributors to international debates about the emerging multipolar world order.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the success of the US economy at the end of the second millennium do not necessarily mean the end of socialism. In fact both capitalism and socialism are beneficial for a unitary human development, which consists of both material and spiritual development. Capitalism, with its emphasis on self‐interest and individual freedom, has been crucial to material development. But socialism, with its preference for other‐interest and collective necessity, is conducive to spiritual development. Thus, what is needed for further development of the human race is a unitary economics that synergizes capitalism and scoialism.